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This article provides an inventory of the concrete moments of choice,
problems and challenges that scholars are confronted with when
using legislation, case law and literature commentaries within
doctrinal legal inquiry. The inventory is achieved by conducting a
systematic literature review and an explorative empirical
investigation among legal scholars employed at the Tilburg Law
School. This study shows that doctrinal legal inquiry is subjected to
more and other moments of choice, problems and challenges
surrounding the source-usage process than one might expect. The
inventory offers (especially young) legal scholars an understanding
of the complexity of doctrinal legal research and a checklist for
identifying (possibly) problematic aspects of their own source-usage
process.
1 Introduction and background
Within doctrinal legal research, scholars generally do not explicate the
procedures and protocols they followed to assure the soundness of the
usage of sources. (Deane & Hutchinson 2010; Epstein & King 2002, p.
45; Tijssen 2009, p. 124-126). In applications for research funding,
doctrinal legal scholars have – until recently – invariably sufficed by
stating that their research method(s) comprise ‘studying legislation,
case law and literature’ (Vranken 2005, p. 79). This does not mean
that legal scholars are not confronted with concrete or practical
choices, problems and challenges within their source-usage process
(cf. Bloembergen 1988, p. 78; Herweijer 2003, p. 28; Korrel &
Kamstra, 1991, p. 9; Vranken 2014, nr. 106). This lack of explicitness
obscures the exact scope of the choices that were made, and the
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problems and challenges that were encountered (Vranken 2014, nr.
87). Literature on ‘legal research methods’ does not provide the
necessary clarification; the nature of this body of literature is on the
whole ‘highly theoretical’ and often ignores the complexity of concrete
methodological problems encountered by scholars in daily research
practice (Manderson & Mohr 2002, p. 159-161; Tjong Tjin Tai 2013, p.
201; Van Gestel, Micklitz & Maduro 2012, p. 20; Van Manen 2008, p.
1927). This contribution aims at filling this hiatus. It answers the
question ‘ what concrete methodological moments of choice,
challenges or problems legal scholars encounter when utilizing
sources in doctrinal legal inquiry’. To answer this question, I will first
clarify and operationalize the main concepts employed within this
study: ‘doctrinal legal inquiry’, ‘source-usage’ and ‘method(ology)’
(paragraph 2). Subsequently, I will describe briefly the research
methods and techniques (systematic literature review and explorative
empirical investigation) followed, in order to answer the central
question of this paper (paragraph 3). Next, I will discuss the results of
this study (paragraph 4) after which I will draw my conclusions with
regard to the research question (paragraph 5). The reader should be
aware that this study is descriptive; it provides a first inventory of
moments of choice, problems and challenges that legal scholars
(might) encounter in doctrinal legal research. Methods and techniques
that may be used to cope with the identified choices, problems and
challenges fall outside of the scope of this article.
2 Analytical framework
Before I present the inventory of concrete moments of choice,
problems and challenges, I need to clarify the concepts introduced in
the introduction. Firstly, the concept ‘doctrinal legal inquiry’ is in need
of elucidation. In short, ‘doctrinal inquiry involves deriving answers to
legal questions from the study of existing legal provisions, which are
reflected in legislation and case law, as well as commentaries provided
on these sources within literature, thereby assuming that these legal
provisions are internally coherent and consistent’ (Vranken 2009, p.
546-547).  The focus on doctrinal legal inquiry implies that
interdisciplinary legal inquiry, inquiry undertaken in the area of ‘legal
theory’, ‘jurisprudence’, ’legal history’ and ‘comparative law’ research
fall outside of the scope of this study (cf. Bloembergen 1988, p. 63;
Bodig 2011, p. 10; Rubin 2001, p. 8677-8678; Van Hoecke 2010, p.
46).
Secondly, what does the process of ‘source-usage’ exactly refer to in
the present context? In an abstract sense the process of source-usage
can be split into two – at least analytically – distinguishable phases of
the research trajectory: (1) preparing the research, resulting in a
justified and embedded research question (‘preparatory phase’) and
(2) answering the research question(s) (‘executive phase’) (Fajans &
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Falk 2011; Giard 2013, p. 184). This study is concerned with the
‘executive phase’. This phase consists of four distinct sub-phases: (a)
the phase of finding or locating the sources relevant to the inquiry, (b)
the process of making a selection of these sources, (c) the appreciation
(quality and utility judgment) and interpretation (distilling the
relevant information from the selected sources and displaying it in a
correct and useful way) of the selection of relevant sources, and (d) the
synthesis: the effort to forge the derived information into an
integrated whole (Aveyard 2010; Pendleton 2007, p. 161; Wren &
Wren 1990).
‘Methodology’ and ‘method’ are used in many different ways (cf. Cryer
et al. 2011, p. 14; Kamstra & Kunneman, 1988) but for me,
understanding methodology is closely related to what we understand
the field of enquiry to be. It guides our thinking and questioning
within a particular scientific discipline (Cryer et al. 2011; Smits 2012,
p. 111; Watkins & Burton 2013, p. 2). A research method in the context
of the present study by contrast refers to ‘what a scholar actually does
to enhance his or her knowledge, test his or her thesis or answer his or
her research question’. The research method refers to the scientifically
sound (’profound’, cf. Van Gestel & Vranken 2011, p. 910-911) way to
acquire knowledge by the employment of coherent research
techniques related to the collection and procession of data (Curry-
Sumner et al. 2010, p. 22; Van Schaaijk 2011, p. 102).  From this
notion, methodological choices, problems and challenges refer to the
choices, problems and challenges a scholar (may) encounter in his or
her process of knowledge acquisition (through the use of sources) in a
‘scientifically sound’ or ‘profound’ way.
3 Methodological framework
In order to answer the research question set out in the introductory
paragraph, a systematic literature review was performed in which I
collected and categorized the rather scarce and fragmented knowledge
available. In conducting this review, I broadly followed the method
and techniques developed by Aveyard (2010), Fink (2010) and Hart
(2001).  To validate (triangulate), complement and if necessary
correct my findings, I conducted an explorative empirical
investigation among legal scholars employed at Tilburg Law School.
3.1 Justification of the expert-consultation
Twenty scholars were asked to fill out a written questionnaire. As the
intention was to identify the most complete possible overview of
methodological challenges that an explorative study would allow me to
achieve, I needed a collection (a sample) of doctrinal legal scholars
that was as diverse as possible.  Therefore, I consulted scholars active
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administrative law, criminal law, and European and international law)
(cf. Tijssen 2009, p. 82). Moreover, I approached scholars with
different levels of experience – (applying) PhD-students and
(associate) professors (cf. Osborne 2012, p. 3). As a result of the
explorative character and limited time and means, I could
unfortunately not involve a third factor: the research culture of the
institute where the legal research takes place (cf. Cownie 2004;
Tijssen 2009, p. 82). The questionnaire consisted of an overview of
the challenges identified during the systematic literature review.
Respondents were asked to react (acknowledge, refute, comment) on
the identified challenges and were provided with the opportunity to
formulate supplementary challenges. This resulted in the
identification, modification and reworking of the categories of
challenges that were the result of the literature review (Cownie 2004).
The results have been anonymized.
3.2 Limitations of this contribution
The empirical part of this study is admittedly rather explorative and
limited in scope. The main problem is the sample selection. While
there is substantive reason to believe that opinions related to doctrinal
legal methodology are widely diverging between different research
institutes and cultures, only (a selection of) scholars employed at
Tilburg Law School were consulted (cf. Cownie 2004). Nevertheless,
the results of the empirical investigation supplement the systematic
literature and add to the reliability and validity of my research
findings. Although I suspect that my findings may be more broadly
applicable, the results of my expert-consultation can of course not be
generalized to all researchers at Tilburg Law School, let alone to
doctrinal legal researchers of other faculties or research institutes.
4 Research results
In this paragraph I will present the inventory of the concrete
dilemma’s, problems and challenges identified. The challenges are
categorized as follows: first, I will discuss challenges related to the
collection (finding and selecting) of relevant sources (paragraph 4.1).
Subsequently, I will address challenges that relate to the
interpretation and synthesis of legal sources (paragraph 4.2). I must
emphasize that not all identified challenges are applicable to every
doctrinal legal research project or recognizable by all legal
doctrinalists (cf. Cryer et al. 2011, p. 14; Van Hoecke 2011, p. 14;
Korrel & Kamstra 1991, p. 17; Patterson 2011, p. 236; Smits 2012, p.
56; Toma 1999, p. 543-545; Wendt 2008, p. 86). In general, however,
the respondents have indicated that they recognized the choices,
problems, and challenges forwarded in the literature. They did,
however, provided me with modifications, operationalizations and
additions. I once more emphasize that possible methods and
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techniques that may be used to cope with the identified dilemma’s,
problems and challenges (solutions) fall outside of the scope of this
article.
4.1 Collecting relevant sources; a challenging research activity
1. Scholars have acknowledged that the process of finding relevant
sources in contemporary doctrinal legal research may prove to
be very difficult indeed (Cohen & Olson 2007, p. 13; Van Gestel
et al. 2012, p. 1). The growing number of (digitalized) national
and international results in an almost infinite sea of information
(Davidson 2010, p. 563; Osborne 2012, p. 11; Posner 2008, p.
850; Verbeke, Vanhove & Hoekx 2009, p. 1788).  It is therefore
often impossible to oversee all possible relevant sources related
to a specific legal theme. A general inquiry into the area of tort
law, that is, an inquiry that is not strictly limited in scope, for
instance, will yield hundreds of possibly relevant scholarly
publications and thousands of possibly relevant judicial
decisions. Even if it would be possible to oversee and judge all
(possibly) relevant material, it would still be physically
impossible to study such an amount of materials within a single
research project (Tijssen 2009, p. 186). Moreover, plurality
within legal sources is also growing. Should the legal scholar for
instance also search for relevant ‘soft law’, ‘notices’, ‘webpages’,
‘guidelines’, official and non-official ‘communication’, et cetera?
Obviously, the ever-growing supply of information is a major
challenge to the doctrinal legal scholar who strives for
‘soundness’ and ‘profundity’ in the use of legal sources.
2. At the same time, the increasing amount and plurality of sources
that are available to the legal doctrinalists make it more difficult
to find those sources that are specifically relevant to a particular
problem definition (cf. Cohen & Olson 2007, p. 13). One of the
respondents said: ‘How do I find sources that really tell me
something about what I am looking for? (...) I have to search
through hundreds of exhaustive scholarly publications and
judicial opinions in search of that tiny bit of information that
could be of actual relevance for answering my problem
definition.’
3. The growing number of (possibly) relevant sources as a result of
internationalization and Europeanization deserves specific
attention (cf. Fisher et al. 2009, p. 239-243). By now, nearly all
fields of the law are predominantly influenced by international
and European legal instruments (Van Gerven & Lierman 2010;
Sieburgh 2011, p. 2, 7).  It has therefore been suggested that
source-usage within doctrinal legal inquiry is not ‘sound’ or
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included (Van Gestel & Micklitz 2011, p. 20-21; Vranken 2014,
nr. 120). Van Gestel et al. (2007, p. 1453) even take it a step
further; they argue that a doctrinal legal research project with
regard to an area of the law that is influenced by international or
European legal instruments, must also consider relevant sources
(case law, legislation and literature commentaries) from abroad
that provide information on these international and European
instruments. Such sources are part of the present ‘state of the
art’ that the researcher should identify and summarize in his
presentation of the problem or question at hand. In
incorporating information from abroad, the legal scholar is
confronted with a variety of additional challenges: sources of
what countries should be consulted? What foreign databases to
consider? How can foreign sources be collected in a reliable way,
taking into consideration the problems of language barriers and
unfamiliarity with databases and institutional systems
applicable to other jurisdictions?  And if one is to consult
foreign sources, is it not necessary to become aware of
methodological issues addressed in the (also large) body of
literature on the methods and methodology of comparative law?
Is it even possible to ‘transpose' an argument expressed in a
foreign source to the scholar’s own jurisdiction? To make sense
of sources from other legal regimes one needs to become
familiar with, again, a large amount of new materials, often
unfamiliar both in form and substance, and often also referring
to a a plurality of sources.
4. When the scholar has decided where to look for information an
additional, perhaps more trivial, challenge emerges. The scholar
should somehow make sure that he does not overlook seminal or
capital sources such as legislation, case law or literature
commentaries (Parise 2010, p. 13). This may seem obvious, but
several scholars pointed out that this threat is real (Van den
Bergh 2004, p. 1435; Van Gestel et al. 2007, para. 6.2). These
authors have identified publications in which such reference to
such seminal sources was missing.
5. Subsequently, a challenge was identified that relates to the
question how far legal doctrinalists must go in collecting data in
order to arrive at ‘sound’ or ‘profound’ source-usage.  Do they
have to consult scholarly publications and case law that was
published ten years ago? And what about publications that
appeared fifty years ago? Do they have to turn to the more
philosophical accounts of issues with regard to contract law if
they want to evaluate the current rules on the termination of
contracts? Of course, the exact answer will largely depend on the
particularities of the problem definition. Nevertheless,
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scholar will often have to make some tough choices in this
regard.
6. In the past decades, digitalization has strongly influenced the
process of collecting legal sources in doctrinal legal research.
This results in the following additional challenges (6 to 9).
Firstly, the process of collecting relevant sources is complicated
by the fact that the growing amount of sources is stored in a
growing number of different (physical and digital) databases.
Skipping a particular database could lead to missing out on
decisive information. The choice of databases the scholar
consults may therefore strongly influence his or her research
outcomes. Choices should be made with due care. Profound
source-usage requires that the research results may not be
dependent on coincidental or ad hoc decisions with regard to, for
instance, the consulted databases (Korrel & Kamstra 1991, p. 18;
Posner 1993, p. 70; Salter & Mason 2007, p. 6; Smits 2012, p.
37). Developing a search strategy among both digital and
physical databases thus provides a prominent challenge for the
legal scholar.
7. Berring already provided a structured account on the problems
and challenges of electronic research in 1997. Apart from the
problems relating to access to digital legal sources, Berring
(1997, p. 199) pointed out several serious problems with the
electronic search possibilities and strategies. He questions
whether electronic database users are aware of the pre-emptive
decisions being made for them by the system they are using.
According to Berring, ‘[t]he danger of the high-end [electronic]
products is that each step in the research process that is carried
out automatically by the front end system, is a step taken away
from the purview of the researcher. Each decision that is built
into the system makes the human who is doing the search one
level further removed from the process’. Although Berring’s
article was published in 1997, I believe that his concerns are still
valid today. The recent dissertation of Van Opijnen (2014)
argues that anno 2014 computer ‘algorithms’ that determine
what and in what order search results appear do not function
optimally. Moreover, it is likely that the majority of the legal
scholarly community is totally unaware of what a computer does
exactly when a user enters a query into an electronic database.
To increase the profoundness of the source-usage process, such
knowledge might in some cases be required.
8. Apart from the technical details of the functioning of electronic
databases, searching through the databases with keywords leads
to additional problems for the legal doctrinalist. Peoples (2005,
p. 663-664) argues that ‘[k]eyword searches provide a list of
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matches in the database but convey nothing about any
relationship between the search results and other information in
the database’. Databases fail to classify information in a
meaningful way. Moreover, according to Peoples, ‘[o]nline
results emphasize the factual elements of a case while broad
legal concepts are neglected. The speed of searching electronic
databases encourages researchers to rely on bits of rapidly
retrieved text to support arguments that are often ill conceived
and devoid of an enlightened, broad perspective’. Bintliff (1996,
p. 346) added, that finding actual relevant sources on legal
concepts or rules often proves to be very difficult: a search for
information on legal concepts (such as ‘burden of proof’) ‘can be
frustrating because of the many different ways these words are
used in case law’. In order for legal scholars to arrive at valid,
credible and profound research results, they have to carefully
think about such issues before starting electronic searches. As a
result of the multiplicity of ways in which legal scholars have
cited case law, literature and regulation in the past, Van Opijnen
(2014) not only convincingly demonstrates that searching for
case law, literature and legislation with key words (for instance
case numbers, dates, names, et cetera) is more difficult than one
might aspect, but also provides us with several examples to
illustrate this point.
9. Partly overlapping with the last two issues, Van Gestel et al.
(2012, p. 15) argued that while search engines and electronic
databases become increasingly important, finding relevant
sources will become more problematic. They state that
‘searching with key words for example will frequently fail to
track legally relevant actions or behaviour’ and that ‘search
engines understand word patterns, not (…) the essence of what
you need to know’. Apart from the danger that highly relevant
sources are overlooked because of semantic reasons, search
engines ‘often come up with haystacks of information while you
are looking for needles’, (cf. Curry-Sumner et al. 2010, p. 27). It
may be clear that the challenges mentioned here do not do
justice to the full range of problems that relate to digitalization
and computerization. Nevertheless, it provides a promising
starting point of getting acquainted with the complexity of
computerized research.
4.2 Interpreting and synthesizing legal sources
1. The choices, problems and challenges related to the
interpretation and synthesis of legal sources demand separate
attention. For centuries and from a wide variety of perspectives,
scholars have thought and written about the process of
interpreting legal sources. On the one hand, (famous) legal
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philosophers and theorists have often covered the topic (such as
Scholten and Wiarda in the Netherlands). More recently, the
topic has also been approached from a ‘legal methodological’
perspective (for instance Salter & Mason 2007). It would reach
too far and result only in repetition to address even the basics of
this theoretical debate on legal reasoning and interpretation.
Instead I will focus on more concrete or practical moments of
choice, problems and challenges that were forwarded by legal
scholars within the recent debate on ‘law and methodology’ and
the scholars consulted within the empirical investigation
performed within this dissertation.
2. Consensus seems to exist by now that legislative enactments and
case law are often deeply ambiguous texts that therefore raise
the question of the possibility of objectivity in interpretation
(Posner 2009, p. 273): ‘[O]ver legal sources hovers the specter of
hopeless indeterminacy and rampant subjectivity.’ Only rarely,
just one interpretation of a particular source is plausible
(Vranken 2014, nr. 119). This has led Hutchinson and Duncan
(2012, p. 110) to question whether it is even possible to plan the
process of analysis and interpretation and to describe this
process in an intelligible way. In this sense, one could argue that
the whole process of interpretation provides a big challenge for
the doctrinal legal scholar.
3. Apart from this general challenge, more concrete challenges
have been mentioned. Vranken (2014) for instance addressed
the following issues: how does a scholar find out whether a
particular source is of high quality or not? How critical must a
scholar be with regard to the prevailing view presented within
the sources consulted? Can a scholar build on the research done
by others or should he or she check whether the prior research
was done adequately (cf. Committee Performance-Indicators
and Ranking 2007, p. 25)? When and why is a scholar allowed to
refer primarily to his or her own prior work (‘self-plagiarism’, cf.
Hesselink 2009, p. 4; Van Gestel et al. 2007)?
4. Another, perhaps more trivial, challenge is that when
interpreting, the scholar faces the challenge of not attaching a
meaning to the consulted sources that the original author of the
source did not intend to present in (or with) the source (Smith
2009, p. 222; Smits 2012; Tjong Tjin Tai 2013, p. 206). The fact
that legal scholars often operate with a preordained result in
mind (as discussed above) intensifies this challenge within
doctrinal legal inquiry. Moreover, it can easily happen that a
scholar accepts an incorrect interpretation of the law because he
or she has consulted just one source (for instance because new
case law emerged, or because the particular interpretation forms
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an exceptional rather than the prevailing view within the legal
community) (Tjong Tjin Tai 2013, p. 205-206). In this context,
the explorative study of Dawson (1991, p. 468) may be
mentioned. While using a non-representative sample of her own
students, Dawson found that the first interpretation of a legal
source scholars come across is often the interpretation that
remains favoured throughout a particular research project. The
legal scholar is challenged to guard against making such
‘automatic inferences’, in order to arrive at ‘sound’ or ‘profound’
source-usage.
5. After having considered eight scientific journal articles in 2007,
Van Gestel et al. have highlighted the danger of conscious or
unconscious selective behaviour in the (selection and)
interpretation of sources in doctrinal legal inquiry. This
challenge is widely recognized within the legal community.
Many scholars have emphasized that once a particular approach
has been chosen, one is naturally inclined to establish an
affirmative answer (‘confirmation bias’ or ‘advocacy
scholarship’) (Van Hoecke 2010, p. 35-36; Miller 1968, p. 291-
294; Schlag 1991, p. 929; Spitzer 2008; Stolker 2004, p. 1415-
1416; Vranken 2014, nr. 117; Wendt 2009, p. 785). This can have
undesirable effects. Take the example of concealed
argumentation (Hirsch Ballin 1988, p. 84; Vranken 2005). This
occurs when a specific unclarity in the law is hidden for ethical
or political reasons, or, conversely, when opinions are presented
while a more thorough analysis is still possible. This particular
challenge becomes increasingly acute when the scholar is
personally interested in the analysis, or pursues a specific
outcome (Barnhizer 2005, p. 21). Unfortunately, empirical
research relating to the manifestations of such ‘advocacy
scholarship’ within doctrinal legal inquiry is still missing (Van
Gestel 2013, p. 65). Another undesirable effect is described by
Vranken (2014, nr. 115). He argues that confirmation bias might
mean that legal scholars may too easily regard certain case law
or literature to be more relevant than others although this is not
evident after critical reflection.
6. In the same research project, Van Gestel et al. (2007) identified
another challenge, that of establishing the mutual authority and
cogency (weight or importance) of legal sources. The issue of the
relative cogency of legal sources is profoundly contested within
contemporary legal scholarship (McCrudden 2006, p. 635; Van
Hoecke 2011, p. 12). Moreover, as Vranken (2011, p. 115) argues,
‘the concealed weighing of interest that is anchored within legal
results [legislation, case law, and literature] and which results in
relevant viewpoints is not set in stone. The validity of viewpoints
needs to be tested over and over again, to determine whether
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their relative worth has changed, and to see whether new
viewpoints or factors have arisen’. The scholar is therefore
challenged to develop a mechanism for the determination of the
mutual relation between different legal sources. The growing
plurality of sources that are legally (‘soft law’, ‘notices’,
‘guidelines’, ‘unpublished papers’ and ‘web pages’) relevant
makes the identification of this challenge even more urgent
(Fisher et al. 2009, p. 235-239). It is unclear how exactly these
sources should be treated within scholarly doctrinal legal
inquiry. Questions relating to their stringency and (hierarchical)
relation to more traditional (national) legal sources have
emerged (Hutchinson 2013, p. 26; Van Gerven & Lierman 2010;
Van Gestel et al. 2012, p. 15).  Moreover, these new legal
instruments appear to change more rapidly than the traditional
legal sources.  This challenge is becoming even more relevant
as a result of the ongoing digitalization (Berring 1997, p. 199):
‘As more and more publishers enter the fray, producing a
dizzying array of electronic products, things will grow more
confusing. Where once a lawyer did not have to think about the
information that she was going to use, now choices will be
popping up like zits on a teenaged face. (…) In other words, cases
are everywhere. Price options will be everywhere. The primacy of
the old paper sets is fading, and a vortex of conflicting claims
and products is spinning into place.’
7. The fact that conclusions do not always directly flow from
consulted sources is another problem or challenge reported by
legal doctrinalists (Epstein & King 2002, p. 32, 34-36, 42; Van
Gestel et al. 2007). Epstein and King state that within doctrinal
legal inquiry it is often attempted to make inferences from a few
exemplary or key cases, without providing any information on,
first, what ‘exemplary’ or ‘key’ would mean within their research
context; second, why the selected cases are ‘exemplary’ or ‘key’
cases, and whether, third, the selected cases adequately or fairly
represent any cases other than those selected by the author.
Without such an explanation it is of course possible that the
inferences reached employing this approach meets academic
standards, but possible is not the same as conclusive. Similar
issues have been formulated regarding the use of legislation, for
example when determining or interpreting the ‘legislative
intent’. Doctrinal legal inquiry often involves consulting the
legislative history, including the parliamentary debates held with
regard to some specific law or statute. Although such an
approach for establishing legislative intent is generally
acceptable, it is often problematic because the scholar ‘never
tells readers how he surveyed the congressional material, how
many of the debates he read, and whether the material cited in
the article represents “key” events, a “few exemplary” passages,
13
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or a systematic sample of some specific kind’ (Feldman 2009, p.
99-101; Levine 2005, p. 2-3).
8. Particularly in the use of case law in doctrinal legal research,
another challenge for the legal doctrinalist looms large. Several
scholars noted the inherently random nature of the publication
of case law (Oldfather, Bockhorst & Dimmer 2012, p. 1191; Van
Manen 2008; Van Opijnen, 2014). Firstly, case law does not
reflect the exact scope of societal problems; the existence of case
law is dependent on the decision of people to litigate and to
follow the complete legal procedure. Secondly, even if a certain
dispute resulted in case law, we must realize that the majority of
case law is not published. Empirical research showed that in the
Netherlands in the period from 2001-2009 only between 10 and
20 percent of Supreme Court decisions in criminal law cases and
between 26 and 38 percent of Supreme Court decisions in tax
law cases were published yearly (Van Opijnen 2014, p. 214). For
decisions of lower courts, this publication percentage does not
rise above 1 percent (Malsch, IJpelaar & Nijboer 2007, p. 105;
Van Opijnen 2014, p. 222-223). Moreover, the criteria or
procedures used for selecting the case law for publication are
(highly) inconsistent, or at least unclear (Malsch, IJpelaar &
Nijboer 2007; Van Opijnen 2014). The legal doctrinalist has to
therefore carefully assess the case law that was consulted and
the conclusions based thereon.
9. Finally, when collecting sources, the scholar is challenged to
confine the broader context and contextual discussion of a
particular research project so that it does not subsume the entire
project (Hutchinson 2013, p. 26).  On the other hand, the
scholar should include all possibly relevant sources for
answering his or her research question. The inconsistency
between those two demands results in several possible dilemmas
for the scholar. Do we for instance have to consult scholarly
publications and case law that have been published ten years
ago? And what about publications that appeared fifty years ago?
Do we have to turn to the more philosophical accounts on
contract law if we want to evaluate the current positive law on
the termination of contracts? And so on.
5 Conclusions and implications
Although I do not pretend to have presented a complete list of
methodological challenges in doctrinal legal inquiry, I think I found
more and other concrete or practical methodological pitfalls in
doctrinal legal research than one might expect. The majority of these
dilemmas, problems, and challenges are relatively new to the field of
doctrinal legal research (Cnossen & Smith 1997, p. 1; Osborne 2012, p.
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11); several challenges specifically relate to the changing source-
landscape due to – in short – a growing amount and plurality of
doctrinal legal sources and extensive digitalization and
computerization (Davidson 2010, p. 563).
In the phase of collecting information, the growing amount and
plurality of (available) information is a particular challenge to the
present-day legal scholar. On the one hand, this trend does result in
the availability of more relevant information, leading to problems and
dilemmas with regard to the selection and assessment of the
materials. On the other hand, finding particularly relevant en
therefore interesting information becomes more difficult.
Digitalization and computerized research increasingly complicate this
process. Both technical shortcomings and challenges relating to
information overload provide problems for the legal scholar
conducting doctrinal legal inquiry. Finally, when the scholar interprets
and synthesizes sources, several problems must be dealt with. The
main problems here relate to researcher bias (that can have many
forms and guises), the determination of authority of, or the hierarchy
among legal sources and the process of generalization from particular
cases or sources or deriving valid conclusions from them.
From all this follows that doctrinal legal scholarship (1) is in urgent
need of more systematic empirical investigation of the methodological
challenges, (2) should search for information on how legal
doctrinalists generally deal with the methodological challenges
identified, and (3) must investigate what all this means for the way in
which doctrinal legal inquiry is practiced and how it may evolve in the
near future. In the end, it is the academic legal forum that must assess
the identified challenges and decide how to deal with them.
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Noten
1 More structured empirical research on quality criteria, challenges
and research methods and techniques applicable to doctrinal legal
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inquiry is currently being conducted within my dissertation research
project.
2 I recognize that different definitions of ‘doctrinal legal inquiry’
circulate and that several nuances to the presented definition may
exist (Vranken 2014).
3 The concepts ‘scientifically sound’ or ‘profound’ in relation to
source-usage within doctrinal legal inquiry have not been clarified or
operationalized within contemporary legal scholarship. Some insights
are, however, provided by Tijssen (2009, p. 60-61) and Vranken
(2014, nr. 34, 90). The scope of this contribution does not allow me to
elaborate on such aspects.
4 Documentation on the exact techniques applied in order to conduct
the systematic literature review can be obtained from the author on
request.
5 Within the literature this technique is known as ‘strategic sampling’.
6 Also explicitly stated by a professor of Criminal Law.
7 Professor of Private Law.
8 According to a professor of Criminal Law, ‘the legal world has been
globalized and research-wise exploded, especially if one has
knowledge of diverse languages and if one does not simply rely on
national or even English literature’.
9 Professor of Administrative and Constitutional Law.
10 Also explicitly addressed by a respondent, Ph.D. candidate of
Private Law.
11 Ph.D. candidate of Constitutional Law.
12 Stated by two respondents, professor with a Private Law expertise
and professor with a Constitutional and Administrative Law expertise.
13 Also stated by a respondent, professor with an Administrative and
Constitutional Law expertise.
14 As remarked by a respondent, Ph.D. with an International and
European Law expertise.
15 Ph.D. researcher of Private Law; professor of Administrative and
Constitutional Law.
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